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Researchers studying innovation increasingly use indicators based on patent 
citations. However, it is well known that not all citations originate from applicants—
patent examiners contribute to citations listed in issued patents—and that this could 
complicate interpretation of findings in this literature. In 2001 the US Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) began reporting examiner and applicant citations separately. 
In this paper, we analyze the prior art citations of all patents granted by the USPTO in 
2001–2003. We show that examiner citations account for 63 per cent of all citations on 
the average patent, and that 40 per cent of patents have all citations added by examiners. 
We use multivariate regression and analysis of variance to identify the determinants of 
examiner shares. Examiner shares are highest for non-US applicants and in electronics, 
communications, and computer-related fields. However, most of the variation is 
explained by firm-specific variables, with the largest patent applicants having high 
examiner shares. Moreover, a large number of firms are granted patents that contain no 
applicant prior art. Taken together, our findings suggest that heterogeneity in firm-level 
patenting practices, in particular by high-volume applicants, has a strong influence on the 
data. This suggests that analysis of firm-level differences in patenting strategies is an 
important topic for future research.  
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 1. Introduction and Background 
The empirical literature on technology and innovation increasingly relies on 
measures based on patent citations. One prominent line of research originated with the 
recognition that simple patent counts are noisy measures of innovative output, since there 
is high variance in the economic and commercial significance of individual patents. This 
literature thus uses the number of times a patent is cited in subsequent citations (or 
“forward” citation counts) as a measure of its importance or quality (Trajtenberg 1990). 
A second stream of research was sparked by the growing interest in spillovers and 
knowledge flows in the innovation literature. This literature uses citations in patent A to 
patent B as indicators of knowledge transmission from the inventor of B to the inventor 
of A. 
However, some are skeptical of the use of patent citations as indicators. For example, 
Gregory Aharonian, editor of the electronic newsletter PATNEWS, remarked on the 
writings in economics: 
“One of the problems with many of these papers is that the economists 
who write about patent citation analysis have little experience with patent 
searching, and don't realize how worthless most patent citations are for 
measuring anything. For example, many of them assume that the citations 
that appear on the front of the patent were all used and discovered by the 
inventor. They then use that assumption to measure flows of information 
between companies and inventors ... What they don't realize is that many 
citations are found either by the examiner or by professional searchers ... 
so that such citations do not measure anything about information flow or 
patent importance. And without detailed analysis of many file wrappers, 
no one knows what percentage of citations are due to inventors, and those 
due to others” (posting to PIUG-L listserv, April 29, 2001). 
 
Historically, this has been true. However, following a January 2001 change in 
procedure at the USPTO, the front pages of issued U.S. patents have indicated with 
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 asterisks all prior art references cited by an examiner during patent prosecution, thus 
distinguishing them from references taken from applicant Information Disclosure 
Statements. The USPTO instituted this change in hopes that indications of the sources of 
citations would "be helpful in compiling statistical data related to prior art submissions so 
that the USPTO can better consider whether changes are required to the rules governing 
prior art statements." In part, the change was responsive to concerns that foreign 
applicants are particularly lax in submitting prior art (personal communication, Karin 
Tyson, USPTO).  
Overall, examiners account for approximately 40 percent of all citations to U.S. 
patents. The magnitude of examiner citations is even higher when measured on a per 
patent basis: for the average patent in our dataset, examiners introduced 63 percent of all 
patent citations to US patents. The difference in means at the citation and patent levels 
reflects the skewed distribution of examiner citations across patents: about 40 per cent of 
patents granted over the period have all citations inserted by examiners, i.e., applicants 
did not add a single citation, whereas only 8 per cent of patents had no examiner-inserted 
citations.   
Though the overall numbers seem to support Aharonian’s criticism, ultimately, the 
extent to which examiner citations affect inferences from citation-based measures depend 
on the specific application in which the citation data are used.  Several recent papers have 
started exploring this issue in detail. For example, Alcacer and Gittelman (2006) assess 
whether pooling inventor and examiner citations gives unbiased estimates of knowledge 
flows and Sampat and Hegde (2007) assess whether examiner or applicant forward 
3 
 citations provide different signals of the private value of patents, as measured by 
applicant payment of maintenance fees.  
In this paper, we describe the institutional process by which citations are generated 
and explore three dimensions which could plausibly affect the share of examiner versus 
applicant citations in a patent: the technological field of the invention, patent examiner 
characteristics, and applicant characteristics.  Our analysis is primarily exploratory rather 
than causal.  Our aim is to provide a set of  broad stylized facts about examiner citations 
with the goal that these data, together with our broader descriptions of the processes 
through which patent citations arise, help inform the interpretation of analyses using 
citation based indicators in specific contexts, and stimulate future research using patents.   
We find that firm-level effects explain most of the variation of examiner citation 
shares, followed by technological field effects and examiner-specific effects. Unpacking 
these firm-level effects we find surprisingly, that applicants with very high numbers of 
patents, whom we call the most experienced applicants, receive higher shares of examiner 
citations than less-experienced applicants. Additionally, non-US applicants receive far 
higher shares than US applicants, reflecting differences in international patenting 
practice. Regarding technology areas, we find strong field-specific effects that correspond 
to a pattern in which examiner shares are lowest in technological fields in which 
individual patents are more economically valuable. 
Our analysis suggests the need for caution in assuming that the portion of citations 
that aren’t knowledge flows are simply “noise” (Jaffe et al., 2000).  The sheer magnitude 
of examiner citations (with examiners adding most or, in a large proportion of cases, all 
citations), means that the noise may far exceeds the signal contained in pooled citations.  
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 More importantly,  the data  suggest that examiner citations are not randomly distributed: 
variation in the share and number of examiner citations is driven by specific 
characteristics of patents, applicants, and examiners. While beyond the scope of this 
paper, assessing exactly when and to what extent examiner citations complicate 
conventional interpretation of citation based data is an important task for future research.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section (Section 2), 
we briefly describe the processes involved in generating patent citations, and then discuss 
how various field-, assignee- and examiner-related characteristics may affect the shares 
of applicant and examiner citations (Section 3).   In Section 4 we describe our data and 
measures. We present the data on patent-level characteristics associated with higher and 
lower examiner shares, first as descriptive statistics (Section 4) and then as coefficients 
from multivariate regression analyses (Section 5). In Section 6 we introduce a 
decomposition of variance analysis to identify the relative contributions of the different 
types of variables to explaining variation in examiner shares at the patent level. In 
Section 7 we present and analyze data on firms with disproportionately high and low 
shares of examiner added citations. We then proceed to analyze the incidence of 
examiner share in self-citations in Section 8.  Section 9 presents our conclusions.  
2. Where do patent citations come from?   
The U.S. patent statute requires an invention to be novel and non-obvious, as well as 
to satisfy other technical criteria, in order to be patentable. Like the patent system itself, 
the novelty and non-obviousness requirements were designed with a utilitarian purpose in 
mind, to ensure that society only incurs the social costs of patents for inventions that are 
significant departures from what is already in the public domain (Barton 2001). The core 
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 of a patent is expressed in its claims, which detail aspects of the invention over which 
inventors and assignees may exercise exclusive ownership rights.  
In order to assess whether the claims in an application are novel and non-obvious, a 
patent examiner compares a claimed invention to the prior art, generally embodied in 
previous patents and publications. If the patent examiner deems that an invention is 
patentable in light of these requirements, a patent is granted. Since 1947, the Patent 
Office has listed the prior art references against which the patentability of an invention 
was judged on the front-page of issued patents.
1 
In this process, prior art citations serve a number of heterogeneous functions: by 
anticipating the claimed invention, they may be used to limit or reject an individual claim 
or an entire patent. Or citations may strengthen claims, by establishing that earlier related 
inventions were different from or inferior to the current invention. They may be 
boilerplate − establishing or “teaching” facts described in the patent, with little direct 
relationship to the patented invention.  
Though examiners are officially responsible for constructing the list of prior art 
references against which patentability is judged, they rely in part on applicant disclosure 
of the prior art submitted with the patent application via Information Disclosure 
Statements (IDS). In the United States, applicants (and their attorneys) have a “duty of 
candor” to disclose any prior art “material to patentability” of an invention, i.e. any prior 
patent or publication for which there is “a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
                                                 
1   Printing of prior art references on the actual patent followed from a Patent Office Order issued on 
December 19, 1946. The first patent to include prior art references was issued on February 4, 1947, and all 
patents since that date include a "references" section. This is not to say that claimed inventions were not 
evaluated against the prior art before this date: prior art searching became common practice with the 
passage of the Patent Act of 1836. Prior to 1947, however, the prior art against which the claimed invention 
was evaluated was available only from the "file history" of the issued patent, stored at the Patent Office. 
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 examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to 
issue as a patent” (USPTO 1998, Section 2242). If an applicant knowingly fails to 
disclose material prior art, an accused infringer can raise an “inequitable conduct” 
defense in court, and if the court agrees the patent will be rendered unenforceable. Even 
absent inequitable conduct, some or all of the claims of a patent can be rendered invalid 
in post-issuance lawsuits or re-examination, if it is subsequently shown that prior art 
material to patentability was not considered by the patent examiner (Allison and Lemley 
1998).  
Incentives to disclose prior art are complex.  The following quote, by a patent 
attorney and former inventor, is illustrative of pressures on inventors and their attorneys 
for full disclosure: 
The first [time], as an inventor, I was introduced to prior art as an 
engineer at IBM. There, we were told to disclose and discuss all 
pertinent publications before they were filed. And failure, we were 
told by the attorneys, was punished by fraud, imprisonment, and 
would result in the disbarment of the attorney that was representing 
us. Basically, the attorneys said that we would have the time in jail 
to basically explain to them why they could no longer practice law, 
and so forth, if we didn't give them the right references. Maybe this 
was unique to IBM, but it's something that I’ve carried throughout 
my career in talking with inventors, and so forth, as far as how 
important I think the duty of disclosure is.
 2 
 
While applicants have strong incentives to disclose known prior art, they are not 
legally required to search for it, and face both incentives and disincentives to doing so. 
On one hand, prior art searching by applicants can ensure that resulting patents are 
enforceable (Allison et al., 2003) as illustrated by a quote from the same attorney: 
                                                 
2   Testimony included in “Public Hearing on Issues Related to the Identification of Prior Art During 
the Examination of Patent Application”, June 28, 1999, before the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office. 
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 One of the worst feelings that I've even seen at a licensing table is 
when you're sitting there trying to license a patent and someone 
passes across the table a 102(b) reference [a prior art reference] 
that is completely out of left field, you've never seen before, that 
says this patent is invalid and indefensible. It’s something that no 
one, as a practitioner, wants to face, and would rather face, have 
that reference come up, early on in the prosecution procedure, and 




On the other hand, applicants may receive broader patents if the examiner fails to 
uncover prior art material to patentability.  These patents enjoy a strong presumption of 
validity (Sampat 2007). Thus Wagner and Parchomovsky (2005, p. 53) suggest that 
“[t]he patentee has both the motive and intent to behave strategically … [i]t might 
involve declining to conduct a thorough prior art search, thus transferring the cost to the 
public, as well as increasing the possibility that the PTO will miss something and thus 
allow unwarranted scope”.
4  
After applicants disclose their references, patent examiners conduct their own 
prior art searches. They may challenge applicants’ claims based on their own prior art 
searches, and communicate with inventors during the examination process (see 
Cockburn, et al 2003, for an excellent discussion of this process). There have been 
considerable attempts at codification and standardization of patent examination 
procedures, but the search process remains largely idiosyncratic. The universe of 
potentially relevant prior art includes patents (over 5 million in the US alone), non-
patented literature such as books and journals, and even information disclosed on the 
Internet. However, in a world of limited resources, the finite corps of patent examiners 
                                                 
3   Ibid. 
4   In addition, since patent law imposes treble damages on applicants who willfully infringe on 
earlier patents (as opposed to those who unknowingly infringe), firms may have incentives to not know 
about competitors’ patents, which also may blunt incentives for prior art searching (Lemley and Tangri 
2003). 
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 faces strict time allocation guidelines per application (Thomas, 2001; Cockburn et al. 
2003). There is widespread concern that examiner time constraints have tightened in 
recent years, when growth in patent applications has outpaced growth in the number of 
examiners (Merrill and Myers, 2004), limiting the breadth and depth of examiner 
searches. As a result, concerns have been raised that the number of “low quality” patents 
issued by the USPTO, i.e. patents that would not satisfy the novelty and non-obviousness 
requirements if subjected to more intensive or complete examination, has increased in 
recent years (Jaffe and Lerner 2006).  
The applicants’ duty of disclosure continues even after the application has been 
submitted. Here again there is no obligation for applicants to search for prior art, but 
applicants are required to disclose prior art they discover (e.g. in preparing applications 
for related inventions). Applicants may also file new prior art to support a claim that has 
been rejected by the examiner.
5   
Patent examiners from foreign patent offices can also be a source of citations 
when patent applications are filed via the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). The PCT 
allows an applicant to file in any treaty member state and designate other member states 
where she retains the option to file within 12 months of the initial application. Under the 
PCT process, the receiving patent office provides results of its patent searches to all 
patent offices designated in the original application.  
  It is from this complex process that patent-to-patent citation data used in analyses 
by social scientists emerge. Both examiner and applicant side capabilities and incentives 
could affect this process, and the relative shares of applicant and examiner citations could 
                                                 
5   As prosecution times increased in the late 1990s and early 2000s, introduction of multiple 
information disclosure statements became more common In fact, starting in January 2008 new regulation 
was enacted to limit the number of new references introduced during prosecution.  
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 reflect these differences. While almost all previous analyses have bundled citations 
originating from the applicant's disclosure with those resulting from examiner's search, 
the policy change discussed in the Introduction means that we can now distinguish 
between the two.    
3.  Determinants of examiner and applicant citation shares. 
To identify the determinants of examiner and applicant citations shares we 
explore the incentives and capabilities of applicants and examiners to provide prior art. 
Applicant's incentives to conduct prior art searches are likely to vary by technological 
field.   Sampat (2007) argues that, in fields where valid patents are deemed important as 
mechanisms for appropriating returns to R&D or to facilitate market trades in technology, 
applicants will expend more effort in searching for prior art.   Survey research (Cohen, et 
al. 2000) on the value of patents across fields indicates that patents are highly valued as 
mechanisms for appropriating returns to R&D in only a few fields – principally 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals.  In such fields, referred to as “discrete technologies”, one 
or a few patents are generally sufficient to create strong monopoly rents, and we expect 
that on average applicants will seek to file strong individual patents, e.g., patents that 
would be held valid if opposed.   In other fields, such as electronics and 
telecommunications equipment, intellectual property is more fragmented and distributed 
among numerous applicants, such that products may be covered by hundreds of patents, 
none of which has great value on its own.   Cohen, et al. (2000) find that in these fields, 
referred to as “complex technologies”, applicants are more likely to value patents as 
strategic bargaining chips in negotiations with rivals, rather than as mechanisms for 
protecting rents in product markets.    Value accrues to bundles of patents rather than 
10 
 possession of a single patent, and the use of patents changes from protecting monopoly 
rents to strategic uses, e.g., hold-up or cross-licensing negotiations (Cohen et al., 2000, 
Hall & Ziedonis, 2001, Ziedonis, 2004).  In such cases, we expect that applicants will 
exert less effort in prior art search, because of a lower expectation of the need to defend 
individual patents against rival technologies.  That is, firms’ decisions to search for prior 
art – and the resulting “quality” of issued patents – are likely to reflect field-specific 
factors related to the value and use of patents in those fields. 
Incentives may also differ according to the type of applicant. Since the passage of 
the Bayh-Dole act in 1980, universities have become active patenting organizations 
(Mowery et al. 2001). These entities typically license their patents to firms, rather than 
commercialize them directly. Moreover, since under Federal law universities, rather than 
individual professors, take title to patents, they typically employ patent and licensing 
professionals to screen inventions and draft patents.  Technology transfer offices may 
only choose to patent those inventions with a high probability of earning revenue through 
licensing.  If strong patents are important for licensing, we would expect that patents 
assigned to such entities would have relatively high applicant share of references.   
Firm experience and firm size may affect the examiner citation shares. Popp et al. 
(2003) suggest that an entity’s patenting experience may affect its patenting practices.    
Larger firms and/or firms that file numerous patents are likely to have the resources to 
engage lawyers and professional patent searchers, conduct prior art searches and/or know 
the relevant prior art (Mossinghoff, in USPTO 1999).  Greater resources and patenting 
capabilities would lead to the expectation that larger and/or more experienced firms 
would have a greater share of prior art.   On the other hand, incentives may work against 
11 
 this expectation.  Small firms may be more likely to seek to out-license patents than 
commercialize them in-house (Arora et al. 2001) in which case  they may have stronger 
incentives than large firms to invest ex ante in patent quality and search for prior art.   
Furthermore, firms that patent heavily may economize on resources by adopting a 
“scattershot” approach, sending a large volume of patents for examination without 
extensive investment in pre-screening for patentability.
6    
Differences in country-specific patent practices can also affect applicants awareness 
and ability to search for prior art. In most foreign countries, applicants face no “duty of 
candor” similar to that in the U.S..  Thus foreign applicants may be less inclined to invest 
in thorough prior art searches.  Michel and Bettels (2001) argue that for this and other 
institutional reasons, prior art searches in Europe are more selective than in the US.  They 
argue that the duty of candor in the US leads applicants to submit any citation that may 
be relevant. Since examiners may not cull all of these applicant citations, US patents may 
contain many applicant citations that have little relevance to patentability.   
  Many applicants employ lawyers and professional prior art searchers, to draft 
patents and conduct prior art searches, and this could affect the share of examiner 
citations.  Familiarity with patenting examination practices – many patent lawyers were 
formerly examiners – could lead to anticipation of examiners’ actions, and thus reduce 
the examiner share of citations in a patent.  
Previous research by Cockburn et al. (2003) and Lichtman (2004) suggests that 
examiner heterogeneity affects the prosecution and characteristics of a patent. 
Heterogeneity across examiners in their search capabilities can also contribute to 
                                                 
6   In an analysis of Danish patents, Schneider (2007) finds that firms with large patent portfolios 
adopt a “trial and error” strategy, filing many applications and subsequently withdrawing those that receive 
signals from the patent office that they have a low probability of success.    
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 differences in the examiner share of citations. With regard to examiner heterogeneity, the 
most relevant observable dimension is examiner experience. Several commentators have 
pointed to the difficulty the Patent Office faces in recruiting and retaining examiners 
(Popp et al. 2003; Thomas 2001). More generally, a high rate of examiner attrition (Bawa 
2004) may limit any benefits realized from “learning by doing” in prior art searching. 
Thus Jennings (in USPTO, 1999, p. 34) suggests that “turnover of patent examiners” may 
diminish the quality of prior art searching at the USPTO, since “they leave before they 
gain real experience and knowledge of the pertinent art.”  
In the next section we present the data on examiner shares and show how they 
vary according to the dimensions described above.  We then show that the patterns 
identified in the univariate analysis still hold when we control for all the variables in 
multivariate regressions that estimate the share and number of examiner citations on a 
citing patent.   
4. Data and Variables  
To illuminate the relative importance of these dimensions, we use a novel dataset 
that includes all 502,390 utility patents issued between January 1, 2001 and December 
31, 2003. Our dataset is based on weekly electronic files provided by the USPTO that 
contain the information on the front page of utility patents as well as references to other 
utility patents granted in the US. 
In the data, citations based on applicant Information Disclosure Statements are 
treated as applicant citations. (Note that this is true whether or not the citation was 
disclosed by the applicant in the original application, or during the patent prosecution 
process.) Citations from examiner searches are treated as examiner citations. One 
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 complication is that for PCT applications filed first outside the U.S (less than 10 percent 
of the 502,390 patents in our sample result from PCT applications) references from the 
foreign search report are coded as applicant citations, even though they may have resulted 
from searches from foreign patent offices. As a consequence, the share of examiner 
citations for PCT patents may be underestimated. We discuss this in greater detail (and 
attempt to control for it) in the analyses below. 
  
For each citing patent, we calculate the share of examiner citations as a 
percentage of total patent citations. We then show how these shares vary by different 
dimensions of interest discussed above.  Our measures capture patent-level, assignee-
level, and examiner-level variables that we expect will impact the share of examiner-
inserted citations.  
To assess the importance of differences across technology fields, we measure 
technology class of a patent using 3-digit classifications at the USPTO. However, for 
expositional convenience, we present results using broader technology classes, as defined 
by the concordance between patent classes and industries provided by Jaffe & 
Trajtenberg (2002). Specifically, for each citing patent, we constructed dummy variables 
for the following broad technological categories: Computers and Communications, 
Electrical and Electronics, Drugs and Medicine, Chemical, Mechanical, and Other.  
We create a range of variables to examine differences across types of assignees 
discussed above. First, we create a dummy variable Small Entity indicating whether the 
patent was assigned to a small entity.   We base our coding on data from the USPTO that 
indicates whether an applicant qualified for reduced fees based on “small entity” status, 
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 as determined by the USPTO.
 7  Analogously, the Large Entity dummy indicates patents 
assigned to firms which are not small entities.   
We also created indicators for university and U.S. government assignees.  The 
government assignee information is based on “assignee type” data from USPTO's Cassis 
database, and the university assignee data is based on institutions denoted as universities 
in Mowery et al. (2001).  Government patents, which typically are a small share of total 
patents, are expected to be concentrated in fields as biomedical research (e.g., patents 
assigned to the National Institutes of Health) and defense technologies. A catch-all 
category, Other Assignee, includes patents by individual inventors and those which are 
unassigned at issue.  
In addition to small entity status, we include a variable to measure an assignee’s 
experience with patenting.  We define three categories of assignee experience based on 
patent volume from 1976 to 2000: most experienced assignees (more than 1000 patents), 
experienced  assignees (more than 100 patents and less than 1000 patents) and least 
experienced assignees (less than 100 patents)
8. These data were constructed from 
historical patent information found in the USPTO's Cassis. 
As discussed above, the nationality of patent applicants also may affect citation 
practices and examiner citations shares. To assess these differences, we created dummies 
for U.S. and Foreign assignees, and also separate dummies for the following assignee 
countries: Japan, Germany, Taiwan, France, United Kingdom, South Korea, Canada, 
                                                 
7   For more details in the definition of small entities, see 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/appxr_1_27.htm 
8   A classification based on quartiles is desirable but not appropriate because the distribution of 
patent stocks is highly skewed (skewness index of 219.83, kurtosis index of 49,970). Most assignees have 
very low patent volume with a median equal to 2 patents, and the 75 percent quartile level equal to 7 
patents. 
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 Italy, Sweden, and Switzerland..We also include a variable, Lawyers, to indicate whether 
legal assistance was provided when drafting the patent application. Both the nationality 
and legal assistance data were constructed using data from the front page of the patents.  
Heterogeneity in examiner experience may contribute to cross-invention 
differences in the examiner share of citations. As pointed out by Cockburn et al. (2003), 
patent examiner names are transcribed onto the front-pages of U.S. patents with 
considerable error. To facilitate construction of meaningful examiner experience 
measures, we hand-matched each of the 6,172 primary patent examiner names in the 
2001-2003 data to a “standardized” patent examiner name from the 1999 and 2004 
USPTO Employee Directories.  We measured an examiner’s experience at the patent 
office as the number of years since s/he examiner his/her first patent. To avoid imposing 
a specific parametric structure (and since our data are left-censored at 1976) we also 
broke this variable into quartiles, Most experienced, Second and third experience cohorts, 
and least experienced. 
Table 1 shows the data on examiner added shares of citations, overall and 
disaggregated across the dimensions described above. Column 1 shows the percentage of 
patents without any citations by applicants or examiners; overall, this is a very low share 
(2%) although it ranges to as high as 10% for academic patents and patents in the Drug 
and Medical fields.  Column 2 shows mean examiner shares for all citations; column 3 is 
an average of the examiner share on each patent.  Overall, 41 percent of all citations on 
U.S. patents come from examiners (column 2), and the average examiner share at the 
patent level is 63 percent (column 3). The discrepancy between the means reflects the 
fact that 8 percent of patents, examiners insert no citations (applicants account for all 
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 citations), while in 39 percent of patents, examiners insert all citations (applicants 
contribute no citations).   Thus the distribution of examiner citations is highly skewed, 
with the largest share of patents (39%) having all citations added by the examiner. 
The technological field panel reveals a striking degree of field-specific variation. 
Patents in mechanical and computer/electronics fields have high shares of examiner-
added citations, while the lowest proportions are found in chemicals and pharmaceuticals. 
Examiners account for all citations in 45 percent the patents in the 
computers/communications and electrical/electronic fields, and only in one quarter of 
drug and medical patents.  The observed shares are plausibly linked to differential 
commitments to patent quality across fields: technologies in which individual patents are 
more valuable (drugs and chemicals) have higher shares of applicant prior art than in 
complex technologies where intellectual property rights are typically more fragmented. 
Turning next to differences across types of assignees, the data show that at both 
the dyad and patent levels, academic institutions, and small entities have lower examiner 
shares than other types of assignees. This could reflect the greater reliance of these 
organizations on “markets for technology” to the extent that stronger patents—those 
more likely to survive validity challenges—are more readily out-licensed.  But these 
patterns also could reflect other differences between university and government patents. 
For example, academic patents are disproportionately in the biomedical arena (Mowery et 
al. 2001), where examiner shares of citations are lowest. Accordingly, we re-examine 
these differences in multiple regressions that control for field effects. 
Non-US assignees submit far fewer applicant citations than US assignees, which 
corresponds to our discussion of institutional practices in countries outside the US: 63 
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 percent of citations in patents assigned to foreign assignees are added by US examiners 
(74 percent on the average patent), while the analogous share for US assignees is 34 
percent and 55 percent, respectively.   Since foreign patents made up a significant share 
of total granted US patents (43 percent) they have a large influence on the weight of 
examiner-inserted patents in total patents.    
Decomposition of foreign applicants by nationality shows that the examiner share 
of citations is highest in East Asian countries, namely Taiwan (where examiners account 
for 87 percent of citations, 92 percent on the average patent) South Korea (71 
percent/80percent), and Japan (69 percent/78 percent).  Among European countries, 
Germany has the highest share of examiner citations.  Since many of these foreign firms 
patent heavily in the electrical and electronic fields, these trends may reflect field specific 
differences. Accordingly, we employ multivariate regression analyses to determine the 
effect of nationality on examiner shares. 
The next panel shows that firms that are granted a high number of patents are 
adding the fewest applicant citations.  At the both at dyad and patent levels, the examiner 
share of citations is higher for the most experienced assignees: the average patent for this 
group has 68% of citations added by examiners, against 59% and 61% for the second and 
third cohort.  These differences are also present in the distribution of examiner shares 
across patents (columns 4-7); the most experienced assignees have the highest shares of 
patents (43%) with all examiner citations.  Again, these numbers may be driven by 
country and field effects: if many of the most experienced applicants are non-US and/or 
in computer/electronics fields, that could explain their high examiner citation shares.   
Again, we control for these factors in the regression analysis.   
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   Examiner experience similarly shows that the most experienced examiners 
having the highest shares of examiner-added citations, followed by the least experienced 
examiners, although the difference between the cohorts is not as pronounced as it is for 
applicants, and indeed the breakdowns on the distribution of citations across patents 
shown in columns 4 through 7 do not show strong differences across examiner 
experience cohorts.   
Only 7 percent of patents do not list attorneys on the front page, attesting to the 
importance of legal professionals in preparing patent applications.  As expected, patents 
that do not list lawyers have higher examiner shares at both the dyad and patent levels, 
and have more patents without any applicant citations. This likely reflects the role of 
attorneys in performing prior art searches, which appear as applicant citations.  The use 
of attorneys may also have a positive correlation with other professionals, such as patent 
searchers, in preparing applications.   However, we cannot estimate the impact of 
professional searchers as they are not listed on patents. 
5. Regression Model and Results 
We now turn to our regression models that allow us to estimate the marginal 
impact each of the variables in Table 1 on the share and count of citations added by 
patent examiners.  We estimate the following specification using data at the patent level: 
 Y i=Xiβ + εi (1) 
where Yi is either the percentage or count of examiner-imposed citations, Xi is a 
vector of characteristics of the patent described in section 3, and εi is an iid error term.  
When the dependent variable is a percentage, we estimate equation (1) using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and  two-sided Tobit, since percentage values are bounded between 
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 0 and 1.When the dependent variable are counts of citations, we estimate equation (1) 
using a negative binomial, and add a variable citations  that is a count of applicant 
citations on a patent. Since patents granted to a given assignee may not be independent 
observations, in all models we specify that observations are independent across but not 
necessarily within assignees, and adjust the estimated standard errors accordingly, using 
robust  standard errors clustered by assignees on the cited patents
9.  
  The unit of analysis in each of these regressions is any patent that contains at least 
one prior art citation; accordingly, we drop 11,278 patents with no citations, leaving us 
with 491,112 in our sample, which cite 6,235,655 patents. Table 2 provides summary 
statistics for each of the variables in our models. Table 3 shows results from regressing 
the variables above on the percent (Columns 1 and 2) and number (Column 3) of 
examiner citations on a given patent.10  
The goal of the regression analysis is to observe whether the patterns in Table 1 are 
still present when we control for other variables that might affect the univariate shares.  
Overall the regressions provide support for the key findings in the univariate descriptive 
statistics, and allow us to confirm that the characteristics shown in Table 1 are associated 
with high shares of examiner citations.  Rather than discuss in detail results that 
corroborate those already shown in Table 1, we limit our discussion to highlight the most 
notable results in the models.   
                                                 
9  We also estimated GLM models (a la Papke and Wooldridge 1996) that explicitly recognize that 
the dependent variable, examiner share of citations, is a proportion . We also estimate logit models. Since 
the tails of the distribution are relatively thick (eg, patents with all or no citations added by examiners, 
which are 8 and 39% of patents, respectively) we check that our results are not being driven by these 
patents.   We relate the suite of variables to the probability that all or none of the citations come from 
examiners.   We also estimate models where we remove patents that fall into these two categories.  Results 
are qualitatively similar to those reported here, and are available from the authors on request.  
10   Regressions show field effects at the level of broad technology categories.  Models that use more 
detailed 3-digit patent classes show similar results and are available on request. 
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   The field effects remain after controlling for nationality, assignee size, and other 
factors: examiner-added citations are significantly lower in the drug/medical and 
chemical fields, and higher in computer, electrical and electronics fields, whether 
measured as a percentage or number of citations.  Academic institutions and small firms 
have significantly lower examiner shares, even after controlling for the technological 
fields they are patenting in.   Non-US assignees receive significantly higher shares and 
numbers examiner citations, even after controlling for field effects.   Interestingly, the 
results on assignee experience, which may have been driven by field and nationality, still 
hold in the regressions for shares of examiner citations.  However, they are not significant 
when measured as a count of citations.  It is possible that this reflects lower total citations 
on many of these patents, which would occur if they were of relatively minor value. 
  We note that the similarity between the negative binomial model, which controls 
for total citations on a patent, and the models that use citation shares indicates that our 
results are not driven by patents that contain very few (or many) applicant citations.   The 
negative and significant coefficient on the count variable of applicant citations shows that 
controlling for other factors, the more applicants add citations, the fewer citations 
inserted by examiners.  
One potential complication is the patent grant lag, and the possibility that examiners 
but not applicants disproportionately add citations during patent pendency. If this were 
true, and the grant lag were correlated with other variables in the models above, our 
results could be biased. 
  As discussed in the introduction, the applicant’s duty of candor extends to the 
entire patent prosecution period, so if applicants become aware of material prior art after 
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 filing the initial application, they are required to disclose this art. The data show that of 
the 12 percent of all citations to patents that issue after the citing patent is filed, 25 
percent come from applicants. While lower than the overall applicant share of citations 
(41 percent), this suggests that applicants are active in contributing prior art during patent 
prosecution, but that examiners are much more likely to do so.
11 
  To account for this, we re-ran our models and explicitly controlled for the grant 
lag. Columns 4-6 of Table 3 show these results. The estimated coefficient on the grant 
variable is positive and significant, indicating that longer lags are associated with higher 
examiner shares of citations. However, none of the other coefficients change materially. 
  Another potential complication is that citations in applications filed via the PCT 
are coded as applicant citations, even if they are likely to emanate from foreign search 
reports. To see if these citations affect our results, we re-estimated all of the models after 
eliminating the 42,806 patents that were filed through the PCT process. Columns 7-9 of 
Table 3 show that results are nearly identical to those in models which included PCT-
filed patents. 
6.  Decomposition of variance 
The analysis in Section 5 shows the marginal impact of assignee, examiner, and field 
effects on examiner citations. In this section, we assess the importance of each of these 
classes of variables in explaining the total variation in the examiner share.  
Following Skondral & Rabe-Hesketh (2004), we estimate a variance component 
model through a linear mixed model with random intercepts. We estimate the following 
model:  
                                                 
11   Our analysis of 50 file wrappers for issued patents shows that applicant prior art introduced 
during patent prosecution is generally introduced in response to examiner rejections, or when applications 
are granted in other countries.  
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where       is the percentage of examiner citations (or self-citations) in patent i, 
applied by assignee j, processed by examiner k and classified in technology l,  
                                  (2) 
  is a fix
  ,   ,   are random effects per assignee, examiner and technology groups such 
that    ~   0,  
  ,   ~   0,   
   , and    ~   0,  
  , and        ~   0,   . 
    ed intercept across observations, 
We chose this model over a more traditional analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
approach for several reasons. First, the large number of observations and categories in 
our dataset (53,022 assignees, 2,069 examiners, and 419 technology classes) make an 
ANOVA analysis of all the data computationally infeasible. A linear mixed model 
implemented through calculations that use spare variance-covariance matrices allows 
inclusion of groups with numerous elements. Second, the three dimensions in our model 
are not orthogonal: technologies, applicant, and examiner effects overlap. Accordingly, 
the explained variance cannot be partitioned uniquely among the independent variables, 
and the order in which variables are introduced will therefore affect the results. Mixed 
linear models incorporate the covariance between groups so the estimates are obtained    
controlling for variance attributed to other groups in the model. 
The first column of Table 4 shows the results from estimating this model. The first 
panel shows the variance estimates for assignees, examiners, technologies and the model 
residual, and the second one shows the estimates for the fixed intercept, which can be 
thought of as the model average.  
Overall, these three groups explain about 36 percent of the variance in the model. 
But the differences across the categories are striking. Of the explained variation, assignee 
23 
 effects explain 91 percent, examiner effects 9 percent, and technology categories only 8 
percent.   In other words, heterogeneity across applicants explains almost all the variation 
in shares of examiner citations on patents! 
The magnitude of variation attributed to individual assignees could be driven by 
assignees with only one patent. As a robustness check we also estimated the model for 
assignees with between 100 and  1,000 patents (Column 2) and at least 1000 patents 
(Column 3)
12.  This last model captures many of the assignees in the “most experienced” 
cohort in our multivariate regressions.  We find that the effect of assignee heterogeneity 
is still very high, though it falls by a few percentage points as assignee patent volume 
increases.  Moreover, the variation explained by technologies rises from 8 percent in the 
full dataset to nearly 20 percent of variation for assignees with over 1000 patents.  This is 
in line with our expectation that field effects should matter for citations, and also supports 
the validity of employing technology fixed effects in patent-based studies.  However, 
field effects still account less than one-quarter of the variation in examiner citation shares 
as compared to individual assignees. This finding, coupled with our earlier finding that 
high patent-volume assignees have the highest share of citations, points to individual firm 
practices as an important dimension explaining high examiner shares on patents. 
7. Firm-Level Analysis 
Overall, these results point to individual assignee effects as a dominant factor 
affecting variation in the examiner share of citations. We further explore this with 
descriptive statistics on large-scale patent assignees.  In this section, we shift our unit of 
analysis from individual patents to organizations. Excluding patents assigned to 
                                                 
12   The sample size changes accordingly from 429,984 observations to 100,288 observations 
(assignees with between 100 and 1000 patents) and 180,924 (assignees with at least 1,000 patents). 
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 individuals and unassigned patents, our sample includes 53,022 applicants. For each of 
these assignees, we calculated the share of citations inserted by examiners (at the dyad 
level) and the average examiner share of citations in the firm’s patents (averaged across 
all of the firm’s patents).  
The x-axis of Figure 1 shows the average examiner share of citations for the top 10 
assignees in each of the 6 broad field categories. As suggested by our earlier findings in 
the univariate and multivariate analyses, examiner shares are lowest for firms in the 
drugs/medicine and chemical fields, and highest in electronics and 
computers/communications.  
However the chart also reveals considerable within-field variation, as our variance 
decomposition analyses would have predicted. Compare, for instance, Fuji versus Kodak 
in the chemical field, Pfizer versus Merck in the drugs/medical field, or Micron versus 
NEC in electronics. In each of these cases, we observe firms in similar technologies with 
very different examiner shares of citations.  
We see further evidence of within-field firm effects in data showing firms ranked 
by their patent volumes and examiner shares.  Table 5 shows the largest patentees ranked 
by (a) total patents filed in 2001-2003; (b) share of examiner citations in all patents and 
(c) share of examiner citations in self-citations.  The first group includes firms that fall 
into the most experienced applicants, and we note the dominance of large, technology-
intensive firms in electronics, computers, and communications.   However, there is a 
great deal of variation by firm in the shares of examiner citations in all citations and self-
citations, giving further (anecdotal) evidence that firm-level patent practices are 
important in assessing the level of applicant prior art.    
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 Approximately 27 percent of the firms in our sample (14,291) have all citations in 
all of their patents are inserted by examiner. And of the 14,648 assignees with at least one 
patent with a self-citation, 43 percent (6,362) had all self-citations inserted by examiners. 
Table 5 shows the largest ten patentees in each of these two groups, respectively.   Here 
again, we note the dominance of firms in electronics, computers and communications, but 
the firms in these categories are much smaller in terms of overall volume of patenting.    
These data correspond to our findings in Table 1 of a U-shaped relationship between 
experience and share of examiner shares, though in the regressions that control for field 
effects only the coefficient of the top tier of experienced assignees is significant.   
These firm-level differences could reflect unobserved differences in the 
technological breadth of firms’ patent portfolios.   Firms frequently patent outside their 
core product areas, reflecting both firm-level R&D strategies as well as idiosyncrasies in 
the patent classification system.  We re-estimate our models in table 3 at the firm level, 
and find the results are unchanged from those at the patent level.  Furthermore, our 
decomposition of variance analysis estimates the effect of technological field separately 
from firm effects, so we can confirm that this within-technology variation is not driven 
by diversity in patent portfolios
13.   These differences more likely reflect unobserved 
differences in firms’ patent strategies.  Dimensions by which they may differ could 
include: the choice to patent broadly vs. only patenting valuable inventions that the firm 
intends to pursue internally or through licensing; efforts to invest in search ex ante versus 
waiting for signals from the patent office to collect additional references; and the 
crowdedness of the fields they select for R&D efforts.  
                                                 
13   Results for the regression analysis and the variance decomposition analysis at the firm level are 
available on request. 
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 8.  Evidence from self-citations 
Our analysis so far provides evidence on the factors associated with high shares of 
patent citations added by examiners.  But what is the meaning of high examiner citation 
shares?  There are two possible interpretations.  One is that the  applicant share of 
citations (which we can observe) correlates with applicant search efforts (which we 
cannot observe): that, is high shares of examiner citations indicate low applicant search 
effort.  But another interpretation is that applicants do expend effort in conducting prior 
art searches but fail to uncover all the relevant citations, such that examiners then find 
those citations that were missed by applicants.  In this case, applicants do include 
citations they deem relevant, but they do so with error, and examiners fill the remaining 
gaps.  If applicants lack search capabilities or resources, those gaps may be significant.  
In this case, variation in examiner shares correlates with applicant search capabilities, but 
not search efforts.   
  Self-citations help to identify whether applicant citations correlate with low 
applicant search effort or low applicant search capabilities.  Alcacer and Gittelman 
(2006) and  Sampat (2007) argue that self-citations are a more useful signal of the 
intensity and quality of applicant search than all applicant citations since if applicants are 
conducting cursory prior art searches, even if they were resource constrained, they 
presumably would cite their own previous patents if relevant. 
Accordingly, if firms with high examiner share of citations are simply resource 
constrained, we would expect no relationship between the examiner share of self-citations 
(which are relatively easy to find, and thus less affected by resource constraints) and 
other citations. By contrast, if these firms are not searching for prior art, firms with 
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 systematically lower shares of all citations would also have systematically lower shares 
of self-citations.  
  We explore this issue in several ways.  First, Table 6 shows the share of examiner 
self-citations across the same dimensions used in Table 1. Note that the distribution of 
examiner self-citations across technology fields, assignee types, country of origin, 
assignee experience, examiner experience and legal assistance is very similar to the one 
for share of examiner citations in Table 1. Second, we estimate regressions that are 
similar to those in Table 3 using self-citations instead of all citations as dependent 
variable: the results are very similar to those reported for all citations.  At the patent level, 
the same factors affecting examiner shares of all citations affect self-citations. Third, 
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the examiner share of citations and self-citations for the 
top 50 patentees in 6 broad field categories; the X and Y axes correspond to the firm level 
percentage of examiner “non-self" and “self” citations respectively. Note the strong 
positive relationship between the two, across fields. Firms with low examiner share of 
self-citations tend to have low examiner share of other citations. If examiner share of 
self-citations are indeed a useful proxy for applicant search effort, this provides 
additional evidence that the variation in the examiner share of total citations correlates 
with differences in firms' prior art search effort, rather than capabilities . Fourth, we 
repeat our decomposition of variance analysis using only self-citations. The results are 
similar to those for all citations; firm-specific effects explain most variation on examiner 
self-citation shares.
 14 
                                                 
14   Results for the regression analysis and the variance decomposition analysis at the firm level are 
available on request. 
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 9. Discussion and conclusions 
The ready availability of patent citation data has been a tremendous boon to applied 
research on knowledge and innovation.  The role of examiners in the generation of patent 
citations has been thought to potentially complicate these analyses, but difficult to study. 
Taking advantage of a change in the way patent citation data is reported by the USPTO, 
starting in 2001, this paper summarized basic facts on examiner citations, and provided a 
descriptive analysis of factors associated with the examiner-share of citations in a patent.   
  The unconditional means and multivariate analyses suggest that examiner 
citations in patents appear to be systematically related to a number of characteristics of 
technological fields, types of applicants, countries of origin, and examiners.  
  To highlight several interesting results, our analyses suggest that examiner shares 
are highest in fields where intellectual property tends to be fragmented (computers and 
communications, electrical/electronics), and lowest in fields where patents have been 
shown to be more important in appropriating returns to R&D (biomedical and chemical 
patents). Academic institutions have lower examiner shares, even after controlling for 
technological field effects.  Strikingly, the most prolific patentees tend to have very high 
shares of examiner citations.  This could reflect a strategy to build patent portfolios, with 
relatively low value placed on any single patent (Sampat 2007). We also find that 
examiner citations shares are specially high for foreign firms: given that foreign firms are 
more likely to file PCT applications overseas and that citations added in these (by foreign 
examiners) are attributed to applicants in the US, the actual number of applicant citations 
may be overestimated. While properly testing the specific reasons for differences in 
citation practices across types of institutions and types of firms is beyond the scope of 
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 this paper, these simple stylized facts suggest that all citations are not created equal. 
  The results of the decomposition of the variance underscore the importance of 
firm effects.  Indeed, individual firm effects account for most of the explained variance in 
examiner shares, far more than field effects, which are standard controls in the literature.  
Although work by Ziedonis (2004) and Lerner (1995), for example, explores issues 
related to strategic patenting, there has been little research on firm-specific patent 
strategies, including decisions and motives to search for prior art.  The examiner citation 
data, including data on examiner share of self-citations, may facilitate work in this area. 
The aim of this paper was primarily descriptive, and it would be premature to draw 
policy implications from our results. That said, we do note that applicant prior art 
searching, and its relationship to patent quality, are central issues in contemporary patent 
reform initiatives in the U.S.   We interpret low applicant shares of citations as indicative 
of low applicant search effort, and our findings on self-citation corroborate this 
interpretation. Using these data to further explore prior art searching and implications for 
patent quality and patent system reform is another important task going forward. 
We started this paper with a discussion of citation data as indicators. The data we 
reported suggest that examiners account for a significant share of patent citations: 41 
percent at the dyad level, and 63 percent at the patent level. Moreover, the data suggest 
that the extent to which examiners contribute citations is not randomly distributed across 
patents but related to a number of field, firm, examiner, and invention specific variables.   
Thus an overall message that emerges from our work is that patent citations reflect the 
complicated interaction of applicant and examiner strategies, capabilities, and incentives. 




                                                
differences in these types of factors could affect results, and introduce appropriate 
controls or robustness checks if possible.
15 We cannot provide definitive guidance on the 
right way to deal with these issues in empirical work, since this will vary across contexts, 
and, as noted repeatedly above, more work is needed to examine the extent and 
magnitude of potential biases. Rather, we hope that this paper helps raise awareness of 
potential complications, and stimulates further research on the interpretation of citation 
data.  
 
15   In some cases, it may make more sense to use applicant citations along, rather than pooled 
citations, though our analyses suggest that these too may not be pristine measures of underlying concepts 
like “learning” “spillovers” or “knowledge flows”. Figure 1 
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 Table 1   
Propensity of inventor and examiner citations by technological field, assignee type, origin, 




Dyad level Patent level Zero (0%, 50%] (50%,100%) All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full sample 502,390             2% 41% 63% 8% 28% 25% 39%
Technological Field
Chemical 69,180               4% 33% 52% 15% 32% 23% 30%
Drugs & Medical 56,651               9% 21% 43% 22% 37% 17% 25%
Computers & Communications 101,181             1% 46% 70% 4% 25% 26% 45%
Electrical & Electronic 106,323             1% 47% 69% 4% 26% 26% 45%
Mechanical 85,352               1% 49% 67% 5% 26% 28% 41%
Others 83,703               1% 46% 65% 5% 29% 27% 39%
Assignee Type
Academia 10,521               10% 29% 45% 22% 34% 17% 26%
Small firms 61,943               2% 34% 57% 8% 35% 21% 35%
Large firms 365,047             2% 42% 64% 8% 27% 26% 39%
Government 3,038                 5% 57% 68% 10% 21% 17% 51%
Others 61,841               1% 51% 68% 5% 27% 23% 46%
Origin
American 286,824             2% 34% 55% 9% 38% 22% 32%
Foreign 215,566             3% 63% 74% 6% 15% 30% 49%
Nationality
Japan 103,597             3% 69% 78% 5% 13% 26% 56%
Germany 33,984               3% 67% 71% 8% 14% 37% 41%
Taiwan 16,100               1% 87% 92% 1% 6% 10% 83%
France 11,945               4% 62% 68% 8% 16% 41% 35%
United Kingdom 11,428               4% 49% 64% 10% 21% 36% 34%
South Korea 11,268               2% 71% 80% 3% 13% 23% 61%
Canada 10,463               2% 42% 58% 8% 34% 25% 32%
Italy 5,182                 3% 66% 72% 7% 14% 35% 43%
Sweden 4,937                 2% 55% 65% 8% 18% 46% 27%
Switzerland 4,092                 3% 54% 64% 12% 17% 40% 31%
Assignee Experience
Most experienced 184,201             2% 48% 68% 6% 24% 26% 43%
Experienced 103,982             3% 37% 59% 10% 29% 26% 35%
Least experienced 214,207             2% 39% 61% 8% 31% 24% 37%
Legal assistance
 With lawyer  465,993             2% 41% 63% 8% 28% 25% 39%
 Without lawyer  36,397               1% 46% 66% 6% 26% 24% 44%
Examiner Experience
Most experienced 242,128             1% 44% 65% 6% 28% 26% 40%
2nd Tier 148,480             3% 39% 61% 9% 29% 24% 38%
3rd Tier 93,369               3% 39% 61% 9% 29% 24% 38%




   Table 2   




Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent Variables
examiner citation shares 491,112           0.631    0.373        01
assignee citation number 491,112           5.265    4.724753 0 299
Technology
Chemical 491,112           0.135    0.341        01
Drugs & Medical 491,112           0.105    0.306        01
Computers & Communications 491,112           0.204    0.403        01
Electrical & Electronic 491,112           0.215    0.410        01
Mechanical 491,112           0.172    0.378        01
Others 491,112           0.169    0.375        01
Assignee characteristics
Academia 491,112           0.019    0.137        01
Small firms 491,112           0.124    0.329        01
Large firms 491,112           0.727    0.446        01
Government 491,112           0.006    0.077        01
Others 491,112           0.124    0.330        01
Foreign 491,112           0.474    0.499        01
Most experienced 491,112           0.368    0.482        01
Experienced 491,112           0.204    0.403        01
Least experienced 491,112           0.427    0.495        01
Lawyer 491,112           0.927    0.260        01
Examiner characteristics
Most experienced 491,112           0.593    0.491        01
Examiner experience: 2nd Tie 491,112           0.188    0.391        01
Examiner experience: 3rd Tier 491,112           0.183    0.386        01
Least experienced  491,112           0.036    0.187        01




































Chemical ‐0.133 ‐0.223 ‐0.213 ‐0.135 ‐0.226 ‐0.218 ‐0.136 ‐0.226 ‐0.222
[0.007]** [0.012]** [0.017]** [0.007]** [0.012]** [0.017]** [0.007]** [0.011]** [0.018]**
Drugs & Medical ‐0.195 ‐0.32 ‐0.299 ‐0.199 ‐0.327 ‐0.313 ‐0.198 ‐0.325 ‐0.307
[0.010]** [0.016]** [0.031]** [0.010]** [0.016]** [0.031]** [0.010]** [0.017]** [0.032]**
Computers & Communications 0.049 0.095 0.028 0.041 0.083 0.00 0.049 0.095 0.03
[0.010]** [0.016]** [0.012]* [0.010]** [0.016]** [0.012] [0.010]** [0.016]** [0.013]*
Electrical & Electronic 0.02 0.052 ‐0.042 0.02 0.053 ‐0.041 0.021 0.053 ‐0.042
[0.011] [0.019]** [0.011]** [0.011] [0.019]** [0.012]** [0.011] [0.019]** [0.012]**
Mechanical ‐0.002 ‐0.001 ‐0.029 0 0.001 ‐0.024 ‐0.003 ‐0.004 ‐0.032
[0.006] [0.010] [0.005]** [0.007] [0.010] [0.006]** [0.007] [0.011] [0.006]**
Assignee characteristics
Academia ‐0.128 ‐0.243 ‐0.239 ‐0.134 ‐0.252 ‐0.252 ‐0.136 ‐0.255 ‐0.248
[0.013]** [0.021]** [0.021]** [0.013]** [0.020]** [0.021]** [0.013]** [0.022]** [0.022]**
Small firms ‐0.122 ‐0.228 ‐0.097 ‐0.096 ‐0.167 ‐0.074 ‐0.098 ‐0.172 ‐0.073
[0.004]** [0.006]** [0.011]** [0.003]** [0.005]** [0.010]** [0.003]** [0.006]** [0.010]**
Large firms ‐0.093 ‐0.163 ‐0.067 ‐0.125 ‐0.231 ‐0.104 ‐0.131 ‐0.241 ‐0.105
[0.003]** [0.005]** [0.009]** [0.004]** [0.007]** [0.011]** [0.004]** [0.007]** [0.012]**
Government 0.024 0.035 0.005 0.018 0.029 ‐0.016 0.021 0.037 0.006
[0.035] [0.071] [0.040] [0.035] [0.072] [0.040] [0.034] [0.068] [0.039]
Foreign 0.208 0.342 0.166 0.209 0.343 0.167 0.207 0.347 0.169
[0.011]** [0.018]** [0.024]** [0.011]** [0.018]** [0.024]** [0.012]** [0.021]** [0.023]**
Most experienced 0.043 0.076 0.009 0.041 0.074 0.00 0.049 0.08 0.015
[0.013]** [0.024]** [0.014] [0.013]** [0.024]** [0.014] [0.014]** [0.025]** [0.015]
Experienced 0.009 0.013 ‐0.007 0.008 0.012 ‐0.011 0.011 0.014 ‐0.005
[0.006] [0.010] [0.007] [0.006] [0.010] [0.007] [0.006] [0.011] [0.008]
Lawyer ‐0.045 ‐0.08 ‐0.034 ‐0.045 ‐0.079 ‐0.033 ‐0.047 ‐0.081 ‐0.038
[0.010]** [0.019]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.019]** [0.010]** [0.010]** [0.019]** [0.011]**
Examiner characteristics
Examiner experience: 1st Tier 0.0001 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.009 0.019 0.001 0.006 0.007
[0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007]** [0.004] [0.007] [0.007]
Examiner experience: 2nd Tier ‐0.014 ‐0.02 ‐0.028 ‐0.011 ‐0.015 ‐0.019 ‐0.011 ‐0.016 ‐0.027
[0.004]** [0.007]** [0.006]** [0.004]** [0.007]* [0.006]** [0.004]** [0.007]* [0.006]**
Examiner experience: 3rd Tier ‐0.01 ‐0.013 ‐0.015 ‐0.007 ‐0.01 ‐0.008 ‐0.008 ‐0.011 ‐0.015
[0.004]* [0.007] [0.006]** [0.004] [0.007] [0.006] [0.004]* [0.007] [0.006]*
Citations ‐0.042 ‐0.042 ‐0.041
[0.003]** [0.003]** [0.003]**
Lag 0.014 0.021 0.042
[0.002]** [0.005]** [0.004]**
Constant 0.693 0.891 ‐0.224 0.66 0.843 ‐0.318 0.698 0.899 ‐0.226
[0.011]** [0.020]** [0.027]** [0.013]** [0.025]** [0.034]** [0.011]** [0.020]** [0.025]**
Year dummy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes







   Table 4 






Assignees 0.044         0.038         0.026        
Examiners 0.004         0.005         0.004        
Technologies 0.004         0.003         0.006        
Residual 0.093         0.097         0.093        
Fixed effects
Intercept 0.601         0.600         0.631
[0.004]** [0.007]** [0.011]**
Observations 429,984    100,288    180,934   
Groups:  Assignees 53,002      1,840         275           
Examiners 2,031         1,592         1,891        
Technologies 416            402            397           
% of variance explained by model 0.36 0.32 0.28
% of explained variance attributed to
Assignees 0.91 0.89 0.87
Examiners 0.09 0.11 0.13





   Table 5 
Average propensity of inventor and examiner citations by assignee for all patents granted 














(1) (2) (3) (8) (9)
Top 25 assignees
1I N T E R N A T I O N A L  BUSINESS MACHINES CORP. 10114 54% 66% 51% 59%
2C A N O N  KABUSHIKI KAISHA 5760 51% 63% 31% 48%
3M I C R O N  TECHNOLOGY, INC. 5184 20% 34% 17% 31%
4N E C  CORPORATION 4955 87% 90% 88% 88%
5 HITACHI, LTD 4765 53% 69% 53% 64%
6M A T S U S H I T A  ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD. 4758 66% 73% 63% 70%
7S O N Y  CORPORATION 4108 65% 84% 53% 78%
8S A M S U N G  ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 4087 68% 80% 73% 79%
9 MITSUBISHI DENKI KABUSHIKI KAISHA 3800 77% 82% 64% 68%
10 FUJITSU LIMITED 3679 73% 83% 72% 79%
11 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY 3662 33% 54% 30% 43%
12 INTEL CORPORATION 3478 61% 77% 45% 63%
13 TOSHIBA CORPORATION 3463 68% 76% 55% 63%
14 ADVANCED MICRO DEVICES, INC. 3145 58% 73% 54% 68%
15 HEWLETT‐PACKARD COMPANY 2442 55% 67% 34% 50%
16 LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC. 2392 76% 82% 70% 76%
17 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS, INCORPORATED 2279 68% 83% 53% 72%
18 KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS N.V. 2207 72% 77% 95% 96%
19 EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY 2161 35% 43% 30% 39%
20 ROBERT BOSCH GMBH 2132 87% 86% 85% 84%
21 SIEMENS AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 2127 76% 75% 68% 68%
22 MOTOROLA, INC. 2100 51% 74% 50% 60%
23 FUJI PHOTO FILM CO., LTD 2074 73% 78% 65% 75%
24 XEROX CORPORATION 2022 37% 53% 24% 39%









   Table 5 
Average propensity of inventor and examiner citations by assignee for all patents granted 
















(1) (2) (3) (8) (9)
Top 10 assignees with largest % of examiner citations to US patents
631 UMAX DATA SYSTEMS INC. 83 100% 100% 100% 100%
690 FOXCONN PRECISION COMPONENTS, CO., LTD. 76 100% 100% 100% 100%
1317 BEHAVIOR TECH COMPUTER CORP. 38 100% 100% 100% 100%
1401 AMERICAN GNC CORPORATION 35 100% 100% 100% 100%
1762 FUJITSU GENERAL LIMITED 27 100% 100% 100% 100%
1797 UNITED SEMICONDUCTOR CORP. 27 100% 100% 100% 100%
1843 FARADAY TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION 26 100% 100% 100% 100%
1881 AUDEN TECHNO CORP. 25 100% 100% 100% 100%
1915 POLYMATECH CO., LTD. 25 100% 100% 100% 100%
1963 TEXAS INSTRUMENTS ‐ ACER INCORPORATED 24 100% 100% 100% 100%
Top 10 assignees with largest % of self‐citations
129 AGERE SYSTEMS INC. 608 68% 78% 100% 100%
146 HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC. 347 68% 77% 100% 100%
193 NEC ELECTRONICS CORPORATION 263 85% 87% 100% 100%
195 NOKIA CORPORATION 260 70% 74% 100% 100%
204 SAMSUNG SDI CO., LTD. 252 79% 80% 100% 100%
249 COMPAQ INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES GROUP 210 56% 72% 100% 100%
254 FORD GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, L.L.C. 204 35% 51% 100% 100%
310 NOKIA NETWORKS OY 166 75% 74% 100% 100%
327 ALSTOM (SWITZERLAND) LTD 155 69% 71% 100% 100%
332 DELTA ELECTRONICS INC. 155 94% 96% 100% 100%
Citations Self‐citations
% examiner % examiner
   Table 6 
Propensity of inventor and examiner self-citations by technological field, assignee type, 
origin, assignee nationality, assignee experience, lawyer and examiner experience 
 
No. of Patents Without
Dyad level Patent level Zero (0%, 50%] (50%,100%) All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full sample 502,390             67% 41% 57% 30% 11% 11% 48%
Technological Field
Chemical 69,180               63% 35% 50% 37% 12% 11% 40%
Drugs & Medical 56,651               67% 29% 45% 43% 11% 9% 38%
Computers & Communications 101,181             64% 46% 63% 24% 11% 11% 54%
Electrical & Electronic 106,323             66% 42% 60% 28% 10% 11% 51%
Mechanical 85,352               68% 45% 59% 28% 11% 12% 50%
Others 83,703               75% 45% 58% 31% 9% 11% 50%
Assignee Type
Academia 10,521               70% 35% 46% 46% 7% 7% 41%
Small firms 61,943               77% 42% 56% 36% 6% 8% 50%
Large firms 365,047             61% 41% 58% 29% 11% 11% 48%
Government 3,038                 62% 56% 61% 33% 5% 8% 55%
Others 61,841              
Origin
American 286,824             67% 34% 49% 37% 13% 11% 39%
Foreign 215,566             68% 55% 69% 22% 7% 10% 61%
Nationality
Japan 103,597             58% 53% 69% 20% 8% 11% 61%
Germany 33,984               75% 57% 65% 27% 5% 10% 58%
Taiwan 16,100               86% 79% 83% 13% 3% 6% 79%
France 11,945               75% 49% 64% 26% 7% 11% 56%
United Kingdom 11,428               78% 54% 67% 25% 6% 10% 59%
South Korea 11,268               80% 77% 82% 14% 2% 5% 79%
Canada 10,463               81% 39% 57% 32% 10% 8% 50%
Italy 5,182                 81% 57% 68% 25% 5% 7% 63%
Sweden 4,937                 77% 60% 66% 26% 4% 11% 58%
Switzerland 4,092                 77% 48% 60% 32% 6% 9% 53%
Assignee Experience
Most experienced 184,201             51% 42% 59% 27% 12% 12% 48%
Experienced 103,982             63% 39% 55% 33% 10% 11% 46%
Least experienced 214,207             85% 42% 56% 36% 6% 7% 50%
Legal assitance
 With lawyer  465,993             67% 41% 57% 30% 11% 11% 48%
 Without lawyer  36,397               75% 39% 56% 32% 11% 10% 47%
Examiner Experience
1st Tier 242,128             68% 42% 58% 29% 11% 11% 49%
2nd Tier 148,480             67% 39% 56% 32% 10% 11% 47%
3rd Tier 93,369               65% 41% 57% 30% 11% 11% 48%
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